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## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA

In Re:

: Case No. 11-MDL-2270 CERTAINTEED FIBER

CEMENT SIDING

: Philadelphia, PA : February 19, 2014 --: 10:13 a.m. LITIGATION

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE THOMAS N. O'NEILL, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

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Montaque - Argument
             (The following was heard in open court at 10:13 a.m.)
 1
 2
               THE COURT: Good morning, counsel.
 3
               ALL COUNSEL: Good morning, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: I apologize for keeping you waiting.
 4
                                                                  Ι
 5
     was delayed in arriving at the courthouse this morning.
 6
               COURTROOM DEPUTY: You may be seated, everyone.
 7
               THE COURT: Mr. Ervin, would you check in the
     hallways and just call out and make sure there's no one out
 8
     there who wishes to be in the courtroom for this proceeding?
 9
10
          (Pause in proceedings)
11
               THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed?
               COURTROOM DEPUTY: Judge O'Neill, I checked the
12
13
     hall; there's no one out there.
               THE COURT: Okay, fine. The first item on the
14
15
     agenda, who will speak for the class counsel?
16
               MR. MONTAGUE: Laddie Montague, Your Honor.
17
               THE COURT: Okay.
18
               MR. MONTAGUE: Ready?
               THE COURT: You can either speak better here or
19
20
     whichever.
21
               MR. MONTAGUE: No, this is fine. Thank you, Your
     Honor.
22
23
               THE COURT: Just make sure you're behind that
24
     microphone --
25
               MR. MONTAGUE: I will and I --
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THE COURT: -- and as you know, you have a deaf

Judge --

MR. MONTAGUE: Well, I've got my hearing aid in also, Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- so shout.

MR. MONTAGUE: -- and I'll put on the appropriate glasses.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MONTAGUE: As Your Honor knows, I'm sorry that we inundated you with so many papers, but this is a matter of great importance to us. It's a case that involves a WeatherBoard fiber cement exterior siding, and as you will recall, the people -- there has been an issue of this premature failure of this siding.

And there's a warranty that covers it there and we felt that the warranty was not sufficient to cover the damages that were involved and the fact that the siding became defective prematurely, so we have brought a lawsuit involving breach of warranty, breach of merchantability, negligence -- a whole series of claims and over the years, we have finally been able to reach a settlement.

I'd like to start because I think it's important,
Your Honor, to compare the terms of the settlement with what
owners of the homes would get under the warranty, and I'll
start with the warranty, which is a two tiered type of

warranty. The first part deals with the first two years after installation and if there's a defect that can be proven by the homeowner or the owner of the structure, CertainTeed agrees to replace, repair or refund those defective boards, the defective siding at full cost.

After two years, they agree to either repair, replace or refund for the defective boards, but only the cost of the boards, not cost of labor and not the cost of paint, and after two years there's a proration of the cost based on when the date of installation was.

For every year away from the date of installation, there's a two percent reduction in the amount that they will pay. That's under the warranty.

So under our settlement, the claimants receive and the class members who have defects in their boards will receive a lot more, and it's broken down in the following way.

If there is five percent or more defective boards on a particular wall of the house, not only will those boards be replaced, but the entire wall will be replaced, and it will not be replaced just for the cost of the boards, but the cost -- it will be compensated for by the boards -- the cost of the boards for labor and for paint, and that --

THE COURT: Labor and --

MR. MONTAGUE: Paint. Labor and paint. And that figure is being calculated through a -- I guess it's called a

book or a service called RSMeans, which is basically the Blue Book of the construction industry for pricing work and pricing materials and replacement of things and building of things.

So that's if there's a five percent -- five percent or more of the boards are defective. The whole -- on a particular wall, that whole wall gets compensated for.

If it's under five percent, then it's just the boards that are defective, plus the boards that are above it and below if that's necessary to make it look proper, and again, that recovery -- that compensation is for not only the -- not only the cost of the boards, but also the cost of labor and paint.

So it's a substantial settlement. It goes back -people can make claims all the way back to 1999 when

CertainTeed started manufacturing these products. It also has
a proration provision depending on the date of installation,
and I think that's set forth on page 11 of our brief which
will set forth the actual proration.

So that's basically the difference in the -- in our settlement to the -- the warranty. In addition, our settlement is open for six years from the time that the settlement becomes final; that is after all the appeals or any appeals would be exhausted and there's no more basis for appeal.

The other aspect is if in fact during that six year

period, if there is a warranty that is -- I mean if there is a warranty claim that is submitted by a class member and the class member may have for some reason not been aware of this settlement, CertainTeed will submit that warranty claim over to the claims administrator for our settlement and that claim -- that claimant, the person who submitted the warranty will in fact be treated as a claimant under the settlement and be able to get the benefits under the settlement, assuming that his damages qualify.

So that in a nutshell is the benefit -- substantial benefit of the settlement over the warranties, and there's a fund of \$103 million which was put up and was calculated to cover -- would be adequate to cover that particular -- those particular claims that we expect since it's not a situation where every board that was manufactured by CertainTeed was defective. But there are -- there's enough to make it a serious issue for enough homeowners.

So if I may, I'd now like to turn to the certification of the settlement class --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. MONTAGUE: -- unless you have questions.

THE COURT: -- first tell me how the money is to be paid.

MR. MONTAGUE: The money gets paid in -- in order -- there's a -- we wanted to make sure that there were enough

monies to cover all of the claims that could be made over the six year period, so when a person -- when a claimant makes a claim and it's approved, then they will get paid 50 percent of the amount of their claim -- what they're due under their claim, which we believe will be more -- that 50 percent will be more than what they would have received under the warranty.

The second -- the rest of the 50 percent or the rest of the claim assuming up to 50 percent will be paid at the end of the six year period, and that will ensure that there's enough funds in the -- left over to pay all of the -- the funds that are going to be -- all of the claims that are going to be made over the six year period.

THE COURT: But to whom does the defendant pay the money?

MR. MONTAGUE: The defendant pays the money -there's a payment due after the -- a short -- I don't have the
exact dates but there's a payment made the first year, there's
a \$35 million payment that's made initially and then the next
year I believe there are three or -- there are three payments
of totaling \$22 million for the next two years and then
there's -- another year there's a payment -- three payments
totaling \$11 million, and it comes out to \$103 million.

However, if there -- if at any time there is a shortfall, the defendants will -- there's a formula for them to advance some money earlier than they otherwise would pay.

So there's a -- it's a guarantee they're --

THE COURT: Say that again?

MR. MONTAGUE: If there ever was a shortfall because a payment wasn't -- because there's a payment due and there's not enough money in the pot to cover the existing claims, there's a basis -- there's a provision for the defendants to make -- for the defendant CertainTeed to make a quick payment, an earlier payment --

THE COURT: Up to the maximum of 103?

MR. MONTAGUE: I think it's based -- I think the formula says that they can pay up to the amount that was paid out the last quarter. In other words, the last -- the number of claims that were paid out the last quarter, they can -- that will accelerate and they'll pay that in earlier, so there's always a guarantee, and the limit is when you get down to \$5 million in the pot.

If it's under \$5 million in the pot, then they have to make this abbreviated payment which is equal to what the claims were out of in the last quarter, so there's a guarantee that there will always be money in the pot to pay the claims as they accrue -- pay 50 percent of those claims as they accrue.

Now, with respect to the approval of the settlement as a class settlement and the class -- I don't think there's much question about the numerosity, Your Honor. They're

approximately -- I mean, I don't think I need to go through all these things. Is there any -- I'd be happy to just skip over this if Your Honor --

THE COURT: If there's an objection as to class certification, you can respond to it then --

MR. MONTAGUE: Okay.

THE COURT: -- but it's certainly numerous with a common question, that's my --

MR. MONTAGUE: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- preliminary conclusion.

MR. MONTAGUE: Yeah. I would just -- I will say one thing. If the case were litigated, there would be some individual questions that you would have to consider in the predominance area, but because this is a class settlement -- a settlement class, those issues go away.

And what's important I think to the claimants is any of those defenses -- and we'll get into this a little further -- any of those defenses that CertainTeed would raise in litigation are not going to affect the claimants' ability to recover under the settlement. So, in fact, no one will be burdened with those defendants -- with those defenses, which is again a very important aspect of the settlement.

So let me go into the settlement itself and the reasons why it should be approved, and I will basically go through the four points that are raised by the <u>Cendant</u>

Corporation case for a presumption of fairness, and then go through the <u>Girsh</u> factors to show that this is a very fine settlement and fair and reasonable and that it should be approved.

The four factors for a presumption of fairness are the settlement negotiations occurred at arm's length, and they clearly did that.

They've been going on -- they went on for 18 months and after about a year, they went on before Judge -- former Magistrate Judge Melinson as a mediator, and they were eventually resolved, and very hard fought, difficult negotiations.

And even after an agreement in principle was reached, it took time to negotiate the final settlement and the terms of the final settlement. So, it was definitely done at arm's length and vigorously by both sides.

Second is the amount of discovery involved. This was an interesting case because we did a lot of pre-investigation -- pre-filing investigation, both in terms of actually talking to people, finding out about the defects and hiring a forensic engineer who did an investigation and gave us reports -- you know, analyses and opinions, so that we knew we actually had a very good credibility with CertainTeed when we went into the -- when we filed the case because we had this engineering expert background to support our case.

8 9

We had a substantial amount of continuing documentary discovery throughout the case. There were several depositions taken. The experts visited about 12 homes throughout the United States in order to help document their reports and the defects and how they were -- and what their cause was.

As I said, we took several depositions so there is a substantial amount of understanding of the case from the beginning and throughout and particularly when the settlement was eventually reached.

The third issue is the proponents of the settlement are experienced in similar litigation. Actually, Your Honor, I'm -- in this case, I'm the least experienced lawyer, not in terms of class, I mean, we're all -- all of the counsel that were heavily involved have been involved in class actions for a long time.

But Mr. Levin, Mr. McShane -- their firms and my partner, Shanon Carson, all were involved -- have all been involved in similar cases like the <u>Shingles</u> case that was before Judge Pollak, rest his soul. Both Mr. Levin and Mr. McShane were in that and Mr. Levin is heavily involved in the <u>Chinese Drywall</u> case, so we learned -- they learned an awful lot from those cases.

It's one of the reasons why this case has been prosecuted in such an efficient, effective manner, and a lot

of it was because of the expertise that had been built up by the counsel who handled it.

The last issue for a presumption of fairness is the reaction of the class, and it's been minuscule. There are seven outstanding objections. That comes to -- if you take the number of mailed notices that were delivered, it's about -- it's two-tenths of one percent.

If you take a look at the hits that were made on our website -- because we had a website that has all the information on it, there were approximately 64,000 unique hits on our website and if you use that as a base, the number of objections come to one-one-hundredth of a percent. So there has been an overwhelming acceptance of the settlement and a minimum of objections.

There's also been 21 opt outs of which I think there are two cases pending by those opt-outs, but again, that's -- for a case of this size, that is an absolute --

THE COURT: Where are those cases pending? Just as a matter of curiosity, do you know?

MR. MONTAGUE: I think one of them at least is before Your Honor and they're asking to be remanded. I think there's a battle going on about that.

THE COURT: Oh, is that the one in Colorado?

MR. MONTAGUE: Yes.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MONTAGUE: That's Lionshead. And the other one,

I'm not sure. I just learned about it so I don't know. So,

based on those four points, it is very clear that this

settlement deserves a presumption of fairness.

Now, let us get to the particular -- the <u>Girsh</u> factors. The first is the complexity, and I'm not sure I really need to go into that.

This is a case which is going to -- if it went to trial it would require a bevy of engineering issues and economist issues, which are being avoided. There's an array of defenses that would have to be litigated and I'll get into those later.

There's certainly issues of causation and damages which are technical, and of course the class certification issue, so the complexity I think is apparent in this case.

The expenses will -- if not -- if not settled at this time, would mount substantially because of the expert expenses of their reports, their depositions, their participation at trial, their response to Daubert motions -- all those expert activities in this day and age add up to an awful lot of money.

There are the other complex litigation issues such as motions -- you know, various motions practice which is being avoided, and of course there's the issue of the class certification. So the expenses would all increase

substantially.

And the duration of the case if not settled I would say would be at least another two to four years, by the time we'd complete pretrial proceedings, there could possibly be a 23(f) class appeal which would delay things, and then obviously if there's a trial there's post-trial motions and appeals, and so I think two to four years is a reasonable additional time of duration if this case were not settled.

I've already gone over the reaction to the class, which is the second <u>Girsh</u> factor so I won't repeat that, and I've basically gone over the third state which is the state of proceedings and amount of discovery completed. And by the way, Your Honor, to be precise about that, it's set forth in the declaration of Shanon Carson which was filed along with our settlement papers.

The next issue is the risks of approving liability and damages and maintaining the class, and I have to say, the one thing that was apparent for every objector is before the Court today and those that weren't are no longer before the Court because they withdrew their objections, not one of them either recognized or addressed the risks of litigation in this case.

And, I mean, to me that is a total fallacy and a fatal mistake that each of them made because their objections are in a vacuum without understanding the realities of what

this case is and what the risks are.

CertainTeed has raised a litany of issues which could threaten the case. I mean, no one knows how they would all turn out, but I will go through them. First they say that the siding met industry and ASTM standards and therefore it was fine.

Secondly, they say that our claims for negligence at least are barred by the Economic Loss Doctrine, they say that the limited warranty under contract is the exclusive remedy. They say that improper installation and storage could be the cause of the failure of the boards that are being claimed as damaged.

They say that any defects were limited geographically and time wise so it's not a full -- it doesn't go across the class completely, and I have to say that our experience to date has confirmed that.

They would -- they say that -- they claim that we would have to show that each -- that the manufacturing defect caused each type of damage that is being claimed, whether it be the boards shrinking or whether they be warped or cracking or something like that. They have to show that the defect in manufacturing caused each one of those.

They would also for our claims impose the statute of limitations under the various state laws and that's another issue that they would raise, that there are different state's

laws that have to apply. And of course they would have an opposition to how we prove our damages. So there are a tremendous amount of risks involved and I think as Judge Pollak said in the Shingles case -- it was a very simplistic statement, as he always made, "Victory for the class is not assured." I think that's very appropriate.

The next thing is the risk of establishing damages, and frankly I don't want to give a lot of emphasis to that because we are lucky to have this RSMeans -- I call it a Blue Book but it's whatever book that is used which can actually measure the cost of things, so I think there are always risks for damages, but this is not something that seems to be insurmountable.

Next is the risk of maintaining class through trial and appeal, and that is always a risk, particularly in this day and age, Your Honor, when the recent case law has made class certification so much harder than it was five, ten, even three years ago with the Supreme Court rulings and various other rulings that have come down.

It's a very tough issue for plaintiffs in this day and age. And as I said before, there are certain issues which would be raised that could be a threat to class certification if litigated, which this settlement obviates and eliminates.

So, I think there would be a tremendous risk to the plaintiffs of having this case certified as a class through

trial. Not that it wouldn't be, but there's certainly a substantial risk.

The ability of CertainTeed to withstand a greater judgment, Your Honor, that really didn't come into the negotiations so I don't want to make that really a factor one way or the other. It was never an issue.

The range of reasonableness in light of the best possible recovery and attendant risks of litigation, I think understanding, number one, that this is an all cash settlement, there's no reversion to CertainTeed at all, all of the monies go to the class and the awards that this Court is going to make.

And there is no cy pres provision. All of the monies will be distributed and we are going to hand up today, Your Honor, an addendum to the settlement agreement which will, if there's money left over at the end of the six year period after all of the claimants are paid up what they're owed from their claims, the remaining money will remain available for future claimants until it runs out.

So, we are going to hand up an addendum to Your Honor which we'll -- the parties have agreed to, so there is an assurance that all of the funds will be used to pay the class.

If the -- it's hard to say what is the best result that we could have, I guess we would have to say, one, the

class would be certified, there would be a finding that the common manufacturing defects caused each of the injuries that were to the -- to the boards that were -- that are being claimed and that the compensation for those boards would be at least what this RSMeans calculation would yield.

And I think the settlement itself compared to that, Your Honor, comes very close to achieving that, if it doesn't not only achieve that and perhaps more.

And our expectation is that all of the claims -there's a good chance that all of the claims will be paid in
full. In other words, that the first 50 percent payment there
will also be a second 50 percent payment or very close to it.

And as I said before, I believe that the first 50 percent payment will exceed what the claimant would receive under the warranty and that is because (a), that what's being paid for is more, it includes not only the material, but the cost -- the labor and the paint cost, and also it includes more boards -- substantially more boards with respect to a particular wall.

CertainTeed on the other hand thinks that the best result would be that no one could get anything other than what is -- they're entitled to under the warranty, so I think the upshot of all of this is, (one), there is definitely a presumption of fairness, and (two), the <u>Girsh</u> factors clearly support this settlement.

I would like to point out a couple things because I found them quite important, and that is that this settlement, the way it's structured, is very friendly to the claimants, it's not one that makes life difficult. There's been some objections that the claim form is difficult and things like that.

The claim form is no different than what -basically what they would have to prove under the warranty.

And, it's important that we have a process where we can guard against fraud and improper claims because, you know, without this process, people could file claims where they don't actually have CertainTeed boards.

So, it's important that we have a process where we can be careful that the claimant is actually entitled to what they are claiming, and while that does require some onus on the claimant, it's important for the fairness of the settlement.

But there are a couple aspects that I would like to point out. First we sent -- if you remember at the beginning I mentioned that there was this -- this first two year warranty where they get full costs and so forth, but again, just for the boards what were damaged, if in fact someone has made a -- has a claim and they fall under that first two year period, they can recover under the Sure Shot -- what's called a Sure -- what's it called, I forget the name of it --

SureStart.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

benefits folks.

2 E

MR. MONTAGUE: SureStart, it's a SureStart protection. But they can still file a claim and if they would get a greater amount under the claim and our settlement, they can -- they can recover under the settlement but of course it would have to be a setoff of what they get from the SureStart protection warranty, so that's a very important aspect that

There is a provision that allows two opportunities to the claimant to -- guarantees the claimant two opportunities to correct its claim if it's rejected for any reason because of technical reasons or it doesn't have enough information.

It's not going to be rejected outright, they're going to get two opportunities to correct it. In line with that, if someone files a claim for particular boards and it's rejected because they're not damaged enough, within a year after that rejection they can resubmit their claim for those boards because maybe in another year they've been damaged more or their condition is worse.

So because they've been rejected at point A doesn't mean they can't re-file after a year or earlier actually under certain circumstances if at point B they have the actual damage manifest itself to a greater degree.

And of course if their claim is rejected they have

the right to appeal that to an independent reviewer who is selected by class counsel so I think there are an awful lot of protections and safeguards which encourage people to file claims and encourage them to get them submitted properly and paid.

So that is basically in a nutshell why the settlement should be approved. The <u>Girsh</u> factors are accepted, the presumption is accepted, the friendliness of the case is -- the friendly nature towards claimants is very important and of course the amount of the funds which all go for class purposes and no revision or no cy pres is more than adequate.

Does Your Honor has any questions at this point?

THE COURT: Not at present. Thank you.

Mr. Hickok. Mr. Hickok? When I made up the agenda, I'm afraid that I inadvertently omitted you to give you space, so I'll be glad to hear you should you wish to say anything. Sorry about that.

MR. HICKOK: No problem, Your Honor. Good morning, it's good to see you. Just very briefly, we agree with Mr. Montague's description of the settlement. It provides significant enhancements to the warranty that would otherwise be available to class members.

As he said, it was negotiated at arm's length. We raised significant defenses in the case and we were prepared

to litigate the case if we were not able to reach a settlement based on arm's length negotiations. Retired Magistrate Judge Melinson was very helpful in presiding over a mediation that enabled the parties to make substantial progress in what was ultimately negotiated.

Here we agree that under the <u>Cendant</u> factors the settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness and we agree that under the <u>Girsh vs. Jepson</u> factors the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate and should be approved by the Court. If Your Honor has any questions I'd be happy to address them.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

MR. HICKOK: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Lightman?

MR. LIGHTMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Mr.

Manochi will make the presentation on behalf of the Jabrani objectors.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. MANOCHI: May I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. MANOCHI: Thank you.

THE COURT: I don't remember that you've been before me before so I'll warn you, you have a deaf Judge so don't be afraid to shout.

MR. MANOCHI: I don't -- I don't have a problem,

Your Honor, as long as you shout back at me because I'm starting to have that same problem.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MANOCHI: All right, thank you.

MR. MANOCHI: Good morning, Your Honor. My name is Glenn Manochi from the law firm of Lightman & Manochi and we're here today on behalf of the Jabrani objectors. We have a set of papers that have been on file with the Court and we

THE COURT: Get right behind that mic.

would --

THE COURT: I've read your papers.

MR. MANOCHI: Thank you. And what I wanted to do was take a few moments in my 15 minutes to highlight some of the issues that I think still remain, even after the presentation that has been made by --

THE COURT: If you go over a few minutes, I'm not going to cut you out.

MR. MANOCHI: Okay, thank you. I appreciate that latitude. I think primarily the biggest issue that we have is although class counsel today mentioned a number of factors that need to be determined in order to approve the settlement, there's another one that was raised by In Re: Baby Products

Antitrust Litigation which was decided a year ago today, that this Court has an additional duty which is to actually determine what the actual value of this -- this settlement is

1 going to be.

And the Third Circuit instructs the District Court to actually not just rely on what attorneys are saying, but to actually hear some sort of evidentiary proof that establishes what the basis is and what the settlement size is going to be.

I think if we kind of go through the papers that have been submitted, I think they fall woefully short of the obligation which if you'll -- Your Honor will understand kind of comes in a little bit later with regard to the size of the attorney's fees award that Your Honor is being asked to make today.

I think the first one is -- although class counsel says this is a \$103.9 million settlement, if I'm reading the settlement agreement right, there's \$2 million that has been deposited so far.

There's another 35 million that comes in 30 days or 60 days after the effective date, and then there is a year one which is 23 million, a year two which is another 23 million, a year three is 11.15 million, and then in year four another 11.15 million and those are put in in periods of time over that.

The concern that we have is that there's no proof before this Court made by anybody that CertainTeed for instance has the financial wherewithal to actually make those payments, and we're concerned with timing.

And we can discuss that a little bit in terms of attorney's fees and when those will be awarded, but our primary concern is that there's no evidence in front of this Court that CertainTeed has the ability to make the payments that they say they do.

We would have liked to have seen some sort of affidavit by the financial CFO of the company for instance or maybe -- maybe having them post some sort of letter of credit that actually locks in that the money that everybody says is going to come in today we have -- it is actually going to be there four years from now when they have the obligation to do that.

You know, we're concerned with issues like bankruptcy for instance, which could eliminate the settlement altogether. There's no proof there and we think that while based on <u>Baby Products</u>, there has to be a little bit more than just counsel standing here today without any underlying declarations of any expert that says — or anybody from CertainTeed that says we got the money.

The other aspect of this which we haven't seen is there's this notion here -- and everybody in this room will freely admit that there was and has been already a limited warranty in place -- that's going to continue in place kind of running parallel with the settlement agreement. Based on statements that have been made, we don't think that the size

of the settlement fund can really be determined to be \$103.9 million simply because there is a value that has already been out there with the limited warranty program.

There's been no showing whatsoever outside of a -of one paragraph that I think that Mr. McShane has in his
moving declaration that says well, it's \$3.8 million, there's
no basis for how he arrives at that and given the amount of
discovery that class counsel says has occurred.

And if you actually read their moving papers, they've had absolute access to all the warranty claims that have been filed -- the 19,520 warranty claims that CertainTeed has made during the nine or ten or 11 years that are -- that it had been going on, so we think that there's clearly the ability to come up with a dollar number other than relying on what a statement is that counsel made.

So we don't think this is a \$103.9 million settlement, we think that there's got to be some sort of proof that's presented to this Court to actually take out the incremental value of the limited warranty which existed before the first lawsuit in this case was ever filed.

The next aspect of the settlement that is troubling is again, the lack of proof to actually show what is the fair range of what the actual claims warranties are going to be that are going to come under this settlement agreement.

Again, I would point out to the fact that, you know,

Mr. Cole, who was the warranty manager, has provided to class counsel all the information with regard to existing warranty claims. We have also class counsel in their moving papers also say that they have received from CertainTeed a list of every warranty claim that's been filed for the last ten years from -- I think maybe from 2001 through 2012, roughly speaking.

We're troubled here that given all this information, there's no way and nobody who's actually set forth any evidence to determine what the range of the size of the settlement is going to be -- you know, there's issues with regard to that not everybody is going to have qualifying damage under this settlement.

There's issues with regard to well, how many walls of the buildings are going to be replaced. All of that can be determined we believe on information that's already there, yet no effort has been made by class counsel to carry what we believe is their burden under <u>Baby Products</u> to actually show this Court what the actual range of the settlement is going to be.

We're also troubled -- well, not troubled, but we don't -- we have this notion here too, is that in Cole's affidavit that was submitted in support of the final moving -- he is again the warranty manager for CertainTeed -- he says in document number 87-4 that his team has processed during the

limited warranty time -- limited warranty program, 19,250 claims. And then he goes on to say -- which was necessary for the purposes of the notice, that there were 3,755 names generated with open, pending or rejected claims, okay?

And there's also a statement in his affidavit that says the rest of them had been resolved. So my math basically says that there's 15,495 claims that have already been resolved, so I'm not sure and I'm not sure anyone in this room here sitting today is sure as to how many of those should be subtracted from the actual projected value of what this settlement is going to be because the settlement agreement provides that once you've made your claim and resolved it, you don't have the ability to do anything else with regard to the settlement agreement that's here.

So there's this issue of close to 15,500 claims that shouldn't be included in any estimate of what the value of this settlement is going to be because they've already been resolved.

THE COURT: Well, I don't quite understand that. In other words, if -- and I'll ask Mr. Hickok to respond to this, but if in fact CertainTeed is going to pay \$103 million, then that's the value of the settlement however it's distributed among claimants.

MR. MANOCHI: Right, but I think the issue here,
Your Honor, is the fact that what happens if everybody's claim

gets paid 100 percent, okay? And let me just do a little math for you because I think that may help you. Their papers are saying that a relative -- there's approximately 300,000 structures out there with CertainTeed cement board siding. Their claims rate is one percent, according to Mr. McShane.

You then take what they've said in their notice papers. If every single house has qualifying damage, the entire amount, the papers using -- the papers say that using the RSMeans test, to re-clad every house on average will be \$14,000, okay? And we're assuming that means the siding and includes -- and assuming that means the labor.

If you do the math of 3,000 times 14,000, that's the total universe. If everybody files a claim based on the expected claims rate, there's \$42 million, so that's the total settlement and that's -- and that's not including -- that's including 100 percent of the homes all have qualifying damage.

THE COURT: So they're going to get additional money maybe they don't deserve, but they're going to get it. So their members --

MR. MANOCHI: Well, I --

THE COURT: -- of the class and they're going to get the money.

MR. MANOCHI: Then I guess what we need to look at is to look at the actual language that's going to be set forth with regard to the reversion area interest because I hear

Manochi - Argument that, but settlement agreement --1 2 THE COURT: Well --3 MR. MANOCHI: -- itself does not --4 THE COURT: Well --5 MR. MANOCHI: -- contain any language of what happens if everybody gets paid off. 6 7 THE COURT: Well, you have what amounts to a judicial admission in open Court. That's legally binding on 8 9 every party that's represented in this courtroom. 10 MR. MANOCHI: Okay, well I see that, Your Honor. I think that that raises a whole other set of problems as to 11 12 whether or not the notice that was sent out originally is 13 adequate based on the fact that there's no language in the settlement agreement that everybody had the right to look at 14 15 and comment on that says it's reversionary. 16 THE COURT: Well --17 MR. MANOCHI: It's non-reversionary. 18 THE COURT: -- was it your client or someone else's that objected without even reading the settlement agreement? 19 20 MR. MANOCHI: Well, that's why they -- that's why 21 they hire counsel, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Well, you object without even knowing

what you're objecting to.

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MR. MANOCHI: Again, Your Honor, we're here to represent the class and we're here with a set of objections that we believe apply to all class members.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. MANOCHI: But I appreciate that comment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Not really. It's like the English barrister who says with great respect, my lord, when he means exactly the opposite. Okay, go ahead.

MR. MANOCHI: Thank you, Your Honor. I harassed you, you got me. I'm sorry. Okay, I understand the comment too that the fund is non-reversionary.

Again, I certainly -- I think and I would hope that Your Honor would require that something be put forth, either on the record or more importantly on the docket so people who have the ability to look at this case in the future and look at the settlement in the future will be able to actually understand --

THE COURT: It is on the record right here in open Court.

MR. MANOCHI: I know, but the problem is I don't know if it -- I think there needs to be some further notice than here in requiring class members to go -- if they do read the settlement agreement, to determine whether or not this is reversionary or not.

I think that a person's determination on whether they want to proceed, I think that becomes an important aspect

that needs to be somehow out there to modify the settlement agreement as it exists because you're going to have people over the next six years who are going to be able to say -- who look at what we think is not going to be a complete record in terms of determining how it is and what rights they actually have under the settlement agreement.

And, you know, we also have the same comment with regard to the existence of the warranty which the Juelich objectors had -- said well wait a minute, it's not really clear, it's not clear in there whether the limited warranty that existed before continues on.

Now there's been two filings that have also been set forth in the docket that I think need to be somehow related with some certain -- certain sense of adequate notice to the class members so they actually understand what their -- their rights are given these -- the amendments subsequent to the notice that was sent to them.

THE COURT: I think you have a message coming up.

MR. MANOCHI: Excuse me?

THE COURT: I think you have a message coming up.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sorry, Your Honor.

MR. MANOCHI: Okay, I guess the one comment I have with regard to at least what we think is the value of the settlement if everybody gets paid off, there's still we think even after the attorneys are paid off, there's going to be \$40

million left over. Am I -- am I hearing it right, Your Honor, that the class action counsel and CertainTeed today are agreeing that even if there's more money than pays off 100 percent of all claims for everything, do the class members who participate get that money?

THE COURT: I will ask counsel to respond to that.

MR. MANOCHI: And if that is the case, then I absolutely think that you have to re-notice the settlement here because that is an entirely different thing.

I mean, if they're saying that, there should be notice that goes out to class members that says what you will get depending on the claims more than -- you may get more than you're ever entitled to even if this was -- even if you agreed to the settlement terms. But I'll leave that to Your Honor to determine.

We also have -- and I don't know if this is the appropriate part of the presentation, Your Honor, to determine the attorney's fees aspect of the case --

THE COURT: That's a later item in the agenda.

MR. MANOCHI: Okay, then I will withhold my comments. I understand I'll have a right at that point.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MANOCHI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, absolutely.

MR. MANOCHI: And we also incorporate based on our

papers the inter-class conflicts that were raised in our --1 the intra-class conflicts that were raised in our objections 2 3 with regard to that and we rely on the paper there. And then we'd also ask -- we'd also ask based on the motion that we 4 filed late Monday evening that the Court grant our motion for 5 6 leave to file supplemental objections and that they be entered as of the record so that we can rely on those as well. 7 8 THE COURT: All right, fine, file supplemental 9 objections, but they have to come in very quickly and they --10 MR. MANOCHI: Say again? THE COURT: They have to come in very quickly. 11 They're in there, they've been signed. 12 MR. MANOCHI: If you look at I think Docket Number 106 or --13 THE COURT: Oh, they're already in? 14 15 MR. MANOCHI: They're in, they've been signed. 16 They're attached to our motion for leave to file. 17 THE COURT: Okay, I'll consider them filed. 18 If you could look at those we would MR. MANOCHI: 19 greatly appreciate that and we thank you for your time, Your 20 Honor. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Montague, before you get up I'd like to hear from Mr. Hickok about CertainTeed's 22 23 financial ability over a period of six years to make this 24 payment.

MR. HICKOK: Yes, Your Honor, as Mr. Montague

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explained, the payment obligation is over a period of four years with a --

THE COURT: Four years.

MR. HICKOK: Four years, with a \$35 million payment due upon the effective date of the settlement, so essentially one third of it will be paid immediately. CertainTeed is a company that's been in business for over 100 years, it's got more than 6,000 employees.

It's part of the company Saint-Gobain, a French multi-national corporation. It is pure speculation to say that CertainTeed does not have the financial ability to make this settlement. There's absolutely no basis to say that other than pure speculation.

The company has been running its existing warranty program for this product for a period of at least 13 years without issue, and it's really a straw man that's been raised without any substantiation whatsoever.

Your Honor, with respect to the issue of a reversion under the settlement, there is no reversion under the settlement. Under the terms of the settlement, it's very clear that CertainTeed is obligated to make these payments over a period of four years.

There is nothing that speaks to any money at any time being reverted to CertainTeed and in every settlement that I have ever seen that has a reversionary feature to it,

there is expressed language setting forth what that reversionary feature is. There is no such language in this settlement and the obligation to pay is stated expressly the obligation to pay over a period of four years of 103.9 million.

It could not be clearer in my view that there is no reversion to this settlement. As you've noted, we've stated it in open Court that there is no reversion to the settlement and again, I believe that is a straw issue that has been raised here.

Your Honor, with respect to the amount of any monies being left over, I believe the Plaintiff Steering Committee will address that, but as Mr. Montague said earlier, to the extent that there is additional money beyond what would be paid to claimants who claim during the six year claims period, that money will be paid to any additional claimants who come forward thereafter.

And again, it's speculative that there would be, you know, huge amounts of money that go unpaid here, but it's clear that that money does not revert to CertainTeed in any way and it's clear that that money will be paid to claimants as long as that money lasts for the benefit of the class.

If Your Honor has any other questions, I'd be happy --

THE COURT: Mr. Montague you say is going to address

1 that point?

2 MR. HICKOK: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Fine. Thank you, Mr. Hickok.

Mr. Montague?

MR. MONTAGUE: Thank you, Your Honor. I was listening to Mr. Manochi's objections and I don't understand why he's --

THE COURT: Yell into that microphone.

MR. MONTAGUE: I'm sorry, I was listening to Mr.

Manochi's objections and I really couldn't understand why he's objecting. He says there's going to be money left over. It reminds me of what Senator Lieberman said when he was running for Vice President and he said what am I going to do if the inauguration is on the Sabbath, him being an Orthodox Jew, and his mother said you should have such a problem.

You know, I think that's really -- this is an unusual issue. If there is money left over -- and we've addressed that, and I will read that if I may into the record, Your Honor, the addendum that we are handing up today which has been signed by the class counsel and by CertainTeed's counsel.

"Plaintiffs and CertainTeed hereby agree to the following addendum to the corrected agreement of compromise and settlement. If the settlement fund has not been exhausted following the expiration of the claims submission period, the

claims submission period will remain open for as long as there are remaining funds," that is that six year period will remain open. "The claims administrator will continue to accept claims from settlement class members until the settlement fund is exhausted."

"Settlement class members who submit eligible claims during this extended period of time will receive a one time payment for their claim according to the proration schedule in section 7.2C of the settlement agreement up to the point the settlement fund is exhausted."

"The claimant's administrator will pay claims in the order in which they are received after the end of the claims submission period until the settlement fund is exhausted."

The question of what happens if CertainTeed goes bankrupt, a highly speculate thing. If CertainTeed goes bankrupt, Your Honor, this litigation is not worth what's in the warranty so it's a meaningless question and in particular, it's so speculative in light of the strong financial position of CertainTeed, its history and its association with Saint-Gobain.

Then Mr. Manochi is certainly anxious to spend more of the class's money by asking for more notice, which every class member already has notice of the website so anything put on the website they will have notice of. It's routine once there's a website established and the class has had notice of

it that changes can be made on the website and that

constitutes notice, so I don't see his objection there as

anything other than spending more money --

THE COURT: This will be put on the website?

MR. MONTAGUE: Excuse me?

THE COURT: This will be put on the website?

MR. MONTAGUE: Absolutely, absolutely it will be put on the website. So as are all of the -- I believe if I'm not mistaken that all of the filings in this case are on the website so everything is open.

There's nothing hidden and the class has full notice of everything and the opportunity to find out anything they want. And of course there also are telephone numbers on the website so anyone can call and ask a specific question.

The last thing I just want to address, and Mr. Levin probably will get into this -- may get into this somewhat, but this conflict that was raised by -- not by these folks but by another group of objectors who have withdrawn their objections, and Mr. Levin will address the issue of why they should not have the opportunity to take advantage of those objections.

But I'd like to answer it anyway because I'd like the Court to know about it. There's a case in the Third Circuit called D-E-W-E-Y, <u>Dewey vs. Volkswagen</u>, 681 F.3d 170 at pages 185 and 186, it's a Third Circuit case in 2012. And

basically what it says is where the class representatives have the same interests because they can make additional claims as people who may have delayed claims, there's no conflict of interest.

Here's what we have here. We have three different situations. We have people that have damage of five percent or greater of the wall, less than five percent of the wall, or have no damage at all.

Well, the class members may have damage -- their entire home or their entire structure is not damaged so they still have -- even if they make a claim for an entire wall for five percent damage or more of an entire wall, they still have an interest to make sure that if they have damage to another wall that is less than five percent or if they have no claim at all, how their interests will be handled.

So, their interests are identical to the absent class members regardless of what category they fall into.

So unless all of the walls of a class representative are defective, every class member -- every class representative and class member are potentially eligible under the settlement for either the -- one of the three categories where they can file a claim under the plus-five percent, the less than five percent, or they have no damage at all until after the settlement ends -- the settlement period ends and then they still have their claims under the warranty.

Everybody is in the same position. Everybody had the same interest to protect where they might be at any particular point in time so their -- under the <u>Dewey</u> case, it's very clear there is no conflict of interest whatsoever. Did you follow that? Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MONTAGUE: Thank you.

MR. LIGHTMAN: May it please the Court, may I just request two points of clarification for the record? It's Gary Lightman on behalf of Jabrani people. Point number one would be with respect to this reversionary fund.

The way the settlement has been explained in notice to the class and this morning, if there's an excess fund at the end of the six year period, their proposed solution as I understand from this addendum that's being handed up is they're going to extend the claims period and people can object beyond the required claims submission period and --

THE COURT: People can't (phonetic) object.

MR. LIGHTMAN: People can -- excuse me, submit claims after the six year period and the claims administrator will continue to honor these claims. Under their own paperwork though they expect 3,000 claims at an average of 14,000 per claim which they calculate to be \$42 million to be paid out under the settlement if the expected number of claims -- the 3,000 claimants make claims, which means they're going

to put 103 million in escrow or into the settlement pot, they expect to pay approximately \$42 million which leaves \$61 million in this pot, and let's even give them the benefit of the doubt and double the claims so that instead of \$42 million being paid out \$84 million is being paid out.

There is still between \$20 million and \$60 million in this pot that they propose to resolve by extending the claim periods for anybody else who wants to make a claim. In practical effect, if people don't make a claim within the first years, they're not likely to get a bunch more claims after the six year period.

And what if no one else makes a claim? What happens to the money? It sits in this pot forever so another six years go by and you have the original 3,000 claimants they expect to make claims during the six year period, and let's give them the benefit of the doubt, another 3,000 come forward in year seven --

THE COURT: The basis of your objection was it wasn't clear that it would not go back to CertainTeed, okay?

It's now clear, if it wasn't before, that it does not go back to CertainTeed.

MR. LIGHTMAN: From the representations made on the record, I would agree with Your Honor. Then my followup question based upon what happened this morning is what happens to the fund? After 12 years when no objectors are left, what

happens to the \$20 or \$60 million or whatever million is left in there? It shouldn't just sit in the pot. There should be a provision made for the class that's settling their claims to benefit from that instead of it just sitting there.

That's my first objection is even after all objections are done, there's still this pot. What happens to it? And I don't think that's been addressed.

My second point of clarification that I would ask that the class action counsel address is they said that all claimants except for seven including the Juelich claimants have withdrawn their claims.

We've tried to get in touch with counsel for Juelich to find out what's been promised to them or what led to the withdraw of the claim, I respectfully submit that Rule 23(e)(5) requires the Court's approval to withdraw an objection to a class action settlement once made.

I would like the class action counsel to state for the record with respect to Juelich in particular and the other objectors who withdraw their claims whether or not there was -- what led to the withdraw of those claims. They would be the two points of clarification I would ask that the class action counsel make for the record. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. MCSHANE: Good morning, Your Honor, Michael McShane for plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MCSHANE: With regard to the Juelich objectors,
I still personally --

THE COURT: End of the mic.

MR. MCSHANE: Can you hear me? With Mr. Steward, who's Mr. Juelich's attorney, and he withdrew the objections. That was his intent. That's why he filed a document called notice of withdraw of the rejections. Mr. Juelich was not offered or given any special compensation for doing so. He is just a class member at this particular point.

With regard to this issue of a reversionary fund -or excuse me, leftover money -- a potential cy pres, Your
Honor, I can assure you that it is very unlikely that there
will be any money left over. I don't know where the objector
counsels came up with the 1 percent, but it's not from us.
They're making this up.

If you look at the notice where we do an example of a potential claim, that is what we think the potential amount of money will be paid to each class member on average and over time, we think that will exhaust the fund.

Now, it's a conservative estimate so I do believe rather than receiving 50 percent of the value or the cost of re-siding their home, I think it's going to be closer probably to 75 percent. But I would be shocked if there's any money left over. This illusory objection, this what if there's money left over as if we have to try to come up with what's

going to happen for six years from now, I've never seen it before, Your Honor.

We came up with a plan of distribution and entered into a settlement because we think this is enough money to fairly compensate the class members.

In my declaration I go through some of my experiences in other cases and I've been doing this for 25 years, and our estimate of the claims rate and the cost to pay the claims as they come in, again, in our view, will thoroughly exhaust the fund, will in all most likely pay them the amount we estimate in the notice and most likely pay them even more.

If there's money left over at the end, then we'll keep the claims period open, sure, why wouldn't we? We can just keep money out. But this -- this notion that there's \$40 million left over out of a \$100 million fund, Your Honor, there's no basis for that. That's all I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, (inaudible).

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, I hope you don't have difficulty with me with my voice today. If you do, tell me to sit down because it's all in the brief probably anyway. Your Honor, what we have seen witnessed today is a scenario that is playing out throughout the Courts of the United States in Federal and State Courts.

THE COURT: Well, if this is about the (inaudible)

McShane - Argument lawyer, I simply want to concentrate on the -- on the 1 substance of the objections that were made. 2 3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Then I will sit down and you 4 won't have to listen to my raspy voice. Thank you, Your 5 Honor. 6 THE COURT: I have no motion for sanctions pending 7 before me and I will tell you frankly I hope that I will not 8 have one (inaudible). 9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You will not. 10 THE COURT: We'll take a short recess. (Recess, 11:23 a.m. until 11:35 a.m.) 11 COURTROOM DEPUTY: You may be seated, everyone. 12 THE COURT: All right, number four on the agenda, 13 claims motion for attorney's fees and expenses. 14 15 MR. MCSHANE: Michael McShane, Your Honor. Mr. 16 Montague is going to handle the attorney's fees motion, but 17 one other matter regarding the objections. There is a motion included in their latest supplement regarding the Juelich 18 objections and they're based --19 20 THE COURT: Regarding? Regarding what? MR. MCSHANE: The Juelich objections that were 21 withdrawn. 22 23

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. MCSHANE: And they're asking the Court to allow them to adopt them and the reason for that is they like some

of those objections and they want to see what will go stick at the Third Circuit. Your Honor, I've never heard of being able to adopt or withdraw an objection. They had their chance and we think that motion ought to be denied, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, I'll reserve -- if I've said the opposite before, I'll withdraw it. I'll reserve judgment on that motion.

MR. MCSHANE: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. MONTAGUE: Good morning, again, Your Honor.

This is always hard in a sense because we are asking for a lot of money. I think that in this case though it is aptly deserved. The real test -- the test is, Your Honor, these eight or nine factors that are known as the <u>Gunter</u> factors from the <u>Gunter</u> case, 223 F.3d at 195, and most of those I've already covered so I'm just going to mention them but I'm not going to repeat what I already said because I don't think it's necessary.

Number one is the size of the fund and the number of persons benefitted. I don't think I need to respond to that any further. The number of objectors to the settlement and the fees, I've set that out in the record and I don't need to respond. The attorneys' skill and efficiency, I mentioned that before. I would like to mention it again because it is very germane to this particular petition for fees.

As I said, a group of the attorneys here were

involved in the <u>Shingles</u> case before Judge Pollak and they have a great expertise in this area and as a result of that we were able to make a lot of efficiencies and economies that other -- other lawyers would not have made, and plus we had a very good understanding of how these types of cases work and how CertainTeed works and as a result of that, we were able to accomplish a lot more in a quicker time without wasting a lot of time.

And in other cases, because more time is put in, I don't mean to say that it's wasted, but our time here, we were able to target it more so than in other cases because of the experience of counsel and I think that is something that we should not be penalized for but should -- it deserves applause. And I would ask Your Honor to consider that in making the award.

And again what I mentioned, one of the things that I think was really key here was our being able to obtain before filing the case a forensic engineer and in doing some research beforehand and getting some preliminary opinions because when we filed the case and we met with CertainTeed and the first time that we raised the issue of settlement, we had -- we had credibility because of this.

And, we were able to proceed and we both litigated and negotiated at the same time and it took a long time. The complexity and duration of the litigation I've gone over

earlier and I won't repeat that.

The risk of non-payment is the next factor and obviously, all of counsel have this case on a contingent basis, we've advanced the costs and if we did not win the case we would not get paid so there was a -- and I've gone over what the various risks of litigation were and there was a substantial issue as to whether or not we would win the case and therefore we had a substantial risk of non-payment.

The next issue is the amount of time devoted and that again shows the economy. I think it's pretty amazing of the amount of time that we devoted on this given the results and all we accomplished and that time is set forth in the petition and it's 12,656 hours and for a Lodestar of \$6,000,882 roughly.

And I think what we've asked for, Your Honor, is a fee that would be awarded on the percentage basis which was I think 17 -- I should know it by heart but I don't -- 17.8 percent and it would result in a fee of \$18.5 million for all the counsel in the case.

We tried to look -- the next issue is the award of similar cases -- in similar cases and I tried -- we found three cases of fairly recent vintage that had settlement -- class action settlements that were within the range of our settlement and what the awards were, and I'll go over those.

The first was the <u>Rite Aid</u> case which was 146 F.

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Supp. 2d at 706 and that was a settlement of \$193 million and the award there was 25 percent and the multiple was between 4.5 and 8.5, and I wasn't quite sure how they arrived at that but that's what the multiple was stated as.

The second case was the <u>Ikon</u> case in 194 F.R.D. 166 at 195, which was an \$11 million settlement and it was an award of 30 percent with a multiple of 2.7. The third case was the <u>Linerboard</u> case which is reported in 2004 Westlaw 1221350 which was a \$200 million settlement.

It had a percentage fee of 30 percent awarded and a multiple of two -- six -- I'm sorry, of 2.66, so our fee, what we've requested is less than 18 percent and I believe that the multiple comes out to be approximately 2.6 based on what we have expended up to the time of the petition that we submitted -- the petition.

However, as we pointed out, Your Honor, our role has not -- will continue. We have to monitor this and participate in the claims administration process, this hearing and whatever follows and we are not planning to seek any further fees after this award, so this award covers everything until the end.

Then there are the <u>Prudential</u> factors set forth in the <u>Prudential</u> case in the Third Circuit, 148 F. 3d at 33, 338 and 340. The value of the benefits due to the attorney's efforts as opposed to the efforts of other groups, there were

product of our petitioning attorney's efforts.

no other groups, no other efforts this settlement is entirely

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Secondly is the private contingent fee negotiated would be -- I think that the standard is anywhere's between 33-and-a-third and 40 percent in most cases where there is a

private contingent fee, so this is well within that range.

And the third issue to look at under Prudential is innovative terms, and I think this settlement reflects several of those. One is the fact that if over five percent of the -of a wall is damaged -- has a qualifying damage to it, the entire wall gets replaced. That is very innovative.

Secondly, I mentioned at the end of the settlement approval argument all of the various friendly items that are involved in this settlement -- the friendly terms which help class members and encourage class members to file claims, even if they're rejected in the first instance.

And the third issue is the fact that we got cash rather than product or something else because cash -- cash is cash and if this -- if this product were done by on product, it obviously -- what CertainTeed sells -- the price of a product that CertainTeed sells is a lot more than it costs CertainTeed to replace.

So in fact, the fact that this is a cash settlement gives it more value. It also gives the class members the flexibility to replace -- to replace the damaged product or

its walls with anything else, any other product that it wants. So, I think these issues are -- make this a very, very attractive settlement and the terms are -- I think are -- several of them are quite imaginative.

So I want to get back for a second to the multiple, Your Honor, because I know that's something that sometimes people like to attack, but again, I want to stress the cooperation and the efficiency of plaintiff's counsel.

If we had not worked cooperatively with CertainTeed's counsel -- and I'm sure that Your Honor must have noticed that we really -- we never had to appear before you with the discovery issue or any other issue with the case until we got to the preliminary approval stage.

That was all done because of the professionalism and the cooperation of counsel, between the parties and also our foresight to start the settlement negotiations early on in the case, even while we we're litigating.

So I say it took about an 18 month period from the time they started to the time we reached an agreement. But all that time we were litigating too, but everybody had the foresight to start that process early on.

So if we hadn't done that, if we hadn't had that cooperation and hadn't started that process early, then our Lodestar would have been higher, or if we hadn't had the organization and the sufficient -- and the cooperation that

we've had amongst the plaintiff's counsel, our Lodestar would have been a lot higher.

So I don't think we should be penalized for all things that that we've done that resulted in the Lodestar being lower and I think that the 2.6 multiplier in this case is certainly a good cross check for the 18 -- the 17.8 percent fee that we're asking, so we ask Your Honor if you would be kind enough to award that to all of the class counsel. That takes care of that.

We also have a petition out for an incentive fee for the named plaintiffs and I think that was basically addressed earlier so --

THE COURT: (Inaudible).

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}\xspace$  . MONTAGUE: Okay, thank you very much.

MR. MANOCHI: Thank you, Your Honor. There's two basic points I would like to raise with regard to the attorney's fees. The first point is again, I keep coming back to <u>Baby Products</u> just in the sense that there's relevant language there and I think it's relevant for the purposes of determining attorneys fees as well.

Our arguments before were really based on the size of the fund and I want to make sure the Court understands because I don't think that class counsel understood, we're not -- we're not objecting and weren't objecting to whether or not CertainTeed's big enough or tall enough to fund the thing.

We're objecting because there is a burden on them to 1 provide evidence of that to meet the requirements under Baby 2 3 Products so whether or not they have or they haven't is a matter of evidentiary proof. We don't believe it's there. 4 5 THE COURT: Evidence of? MR. MANOCHI: It's a matter of evidentiary proof of 6 7 some sort. 8 THE COURT: Of what? 9 MR. MANOCHI: Of -- well, there's certain burdens 10 that we believe --THE COURT: Of what? 11 MR. MANOCHI: Of --12 THE COURT: Evidentiary proof of what? 13 MR. MANOCHI: Well, that they have the financial 14 15 wherewithal. THE COURT: Well, why isn't -- if you're objecting, 16 17 why isn't it incumbent on you to come forth with at least some 18 proof that creates doubt in my mind that the defendant has the 19 ability to make these payments? MR. MANOCHI: Because I think the burden is on the 20 movants to establish that this is fair. They have negotiated 21 an agreement that says over four years these are the payments 22 23 that are going to be had.

We would expect some sort of even elemental proof of some sort that there's the financial wherewithal. And

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## Manochi - Argument

granted, our objection continues to be that the attorney's standing up here and saying these guys have 6,000 employees and they're a subsidiary of a French company I don't think meets that burden. But --

THE COURT: Your objection is merely speculative, isn't it?

MR. MANOCHI: Well again, it's a burden of proof.

They have -- you know, if they're saying these monies are
going to come in and it's \$103 million fund, we believe that
they have the burden to show that that money --

THE COURT: Now you're conceding it is a \$103 million fund.

MR. MANOCHI: Excuse me?

THE COURT: Now you're conceding it is a \$103 million fund.

MR. MANOCHI: Well, for the purposes of the argument here today, you know, and based on the fact that they submitted a non-reversionary supplement, that that's what they're showing today. And all I'm saying is that I think the proof -- the burden of proof is on them to show it, not on us to disprove it.

THE COURT: Well, the burden of proof is on them to show what's the fairer settlement.

MR. MANOCHI: And I think one of those elements is is the money going to be there in four years and I think that

that's what our objection is, not for us to say it's not going to be there in four years, but they're the ones that have the financial ability to determine where this is.

In any event -- may I continue?
THE COURT: Yes, please.

MR. MANOCHI: Thank you. In any event, it's again we come back to <u>In Re: Baby Products</u> which if I might be able to quote, Your Honor, there's an additional element in addition to what class counsel has indicated today, which is that in addition -- addition to the <u>Girsh</u> and <u>Prudential</u> factors, there's an additional requirement -- additional inquiry as to a thorough analysis of the settlement terms to the degree of the direct benefit provided to the class, and there's a number of factors that Your Honor can consider.

And that Court -- the Third Circuit goes on to say that "the inquiry needs to be as much as possible practical and not in the abstract," and then it -- and it requires that if there's not the proof in front of the Court, that the Court should require the parties to put that forth. And it all ties into the award of the attorney's fees.

Again, our objection is that we don't understand or don't or don't know and there's no proof of any sort in front of this Court as to what the actual value of the claim is going -- actual value of the settlement is going to be, and it's -- if they're saying it's \$109 million, again, we believe

there has to be some sort of to carry the burden of proof 1 under In Re: Baby Products, that they show through some sort 2 3 of actuarial or factual or some sort of showing, some sort of 4 evidentiary showing what the estimated range of the settlement 5 is going to be. 6 THE COURT: Well, I just heard a representation in 7 this Court to which you would just agree, that CertainTeed is 8 going to pay. You're saying they have the burden to show, I 9 understand your oral argument there to show that CertainTeed 10 has the ability to pay it. But I think it's beyond question that CertainTeed has agreed to pay \$103 million. So that's --11 MR. MANOCHI: If that is what Your Honor is 12 determining based on the -- on the representations --13 14 THE COURT: Well, that's what you just said 15 yourself. 16 MR. MANOCHI: Based on what I've heard in the 17 courtroom and based on what they're telling us. THE COURT: Well, that's a judicial concession. 18 It's binding on (inaudible). 19 20 MR. MANOCHI: Hm-hmm, okay and if that is the case, 21

if that is the case that they are -- they are intending to pay the \$109 million then --

THE COURT: They're bound by what they've said in this courtroom.

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MR. MANOCHI: Okay. If I might move on then, Your

1 Honor?

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. MANOCHI: I also think that based on the fact that there -- we have no idea of what the range is and when it's going to get paid, I do believe that the payment of the attorney's fees should track the payments that are being made to the class.

In other words, to the extent that counsel today is expecting \$18.5 million and the ability to pay that all at once to them with not waiting as class members have to wait for six years for a portion -- for whatever remains under the fund --

THE COURT: Well, why isn't this like a structured settlement in the (inaudible)? Under Pennsylvania law, a structured settlement in a personal injury case, the lawyer gets his feet up front. Why isn't this the same thing?

MR. MANOCHI: Well, it's a determination of fairness on your part, Your Honor. If you believe that that's fair based on the submissions that are in front of you, then that is fair. I --

THE COURT: Well, they've already done the work.

MR. MANOCHI: Again, we have -- our objection is that we don't know what the size and the total and when those monies are coming in. Again, it gets back down to the evidence of what happens, for instance, if for some reason

CertainTeed can't make the payments.

THE COURT: Yes, but that's pure speculation on your part and it all comes down to your argument that they have to prove that CertainTeed has the ability to make these payments which they have legally obligated themselves to make.

MR. MANOCHI: Right. But again, we're going out four years and a lot can happen in four years.

THE COURT: That's the whole basis really of your position since you (inaudible).

MR. MANOCHI: Well, to the extent that we don't believe that counsel is getting paid before the class members is fair, that's part of that argument, you're right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me it's like a structured settlement (inaudible). You're at a disadvantage because I'm the lawyer who 35 years ago defended the lawyer who established that proposition in the Superior Court.

MR. MANOCHI: Your Honor, then I've met my match, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, you haven't.

MR. MANOCHI: Thank you. I appreciate your time.

THE COURT: I will consider your arguments. Thank

you. All right, anything else?

MR. MONTAGUE: Nothing more, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else from anybody? All those

silent people down there, if anybody wants a chance? 1 2 Okay, thank you very much. We will take this matter 3 under advisement. Thank you all very much. That was helpful. (Proceedings concluded, 11:57 a.m.) 4 5 6 CERTIFICATION 7 8 9 I, Diane Gallagher, court-approved transcriber, 10 certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the 11 above-entitled matter. 12 13 14 15 16 17 DIANE GALLAGHER DATE 18 DIANA DOMAN TRANSCRIBING